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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Certiorari was granted in this case on petition to this Court 
to review one provision of an order of the Highway Patrol Civil Ser-
vice Commission which indefinitely suspended petitioner. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
HIGHWAY PATROL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
Petitioner was indefinitely suspended from the Utah Highway 
Patrol with certain conditions for possible reinstatement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CERTIORARI 
Petitioner seeks to have a portion of his suspension order 
modified which relates to his possible future employment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner's Statement of Facts adequately sets forth the facts 
in this case. 
- POINTS ON APPEAL 
PETITIONER HAS NO STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE SUBJECT ORDER AS HE 
HAS NOT BEEN INJURED BY IT AND MAY NEVER BE INJURED BY IT. 
Petitioner, at page 9 of his brief, concedes that he does not con-
tend that the Commissioner of Public Safety has acted or is about to act 
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in a partial or improper manner. Absent such proof that he is likely 
to do so, it must be assumed by this Court that the actions of the 
Commissioner will be proper and in accordance with law. In the event 
the Commissioner's future determination is objectionable, the petitioner 
would then have recourse to the Commission itself to determine whether 
the Commissioner had acted properly and if the Commission upheld the 
challenged action then such an appeal as this would be in order, but not 
before then. At the present time, the petitioner has no standing as 
he has not been injured by the subject order. Petitioner may not 
properly ask this Court to speculate as to what the Commissioner may do 
in the event a decision by him on this problem is called for in the 
future. The appellate process ought not to be required to conjecture 
upon speculation to eliminate the risk that the Commissioner "will never 
even be tempted to be partial." Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d 
333, 481 P.2d 669. 
The case of Hagerman v. Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 170 A.L.R. 199, 
71 N.E. 2d 246, is not in point as the delegation there complained of was 
a check off for dues in a union of public employees by payroll deduction. 
There the court said (p. 209): 
"The law provides for the election and appointment of 
officials whose duties would be interfered with by the 
intrusion of outside organizations." (emphasis added)e 
Here no "outside organization" or individual is involved in the subject 
order but only the duly appointed Commissioner of Public Safety. There 
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are no similarities to the case at bar. 
Sec, 27-11-10, U.C.A. 1953, upon which petitioner relies as the 
controlling authority, is not applicable because that section covers the 
initial employment of members of the Highway Patrol, whereas the peti-
tioner here is not seeking employment as he has already been employed. 
Subsection (b) of that section would not be appropriate to the instant 
case as the petitioner obviously would not want petitioner to be con-
sidered as one of three applicants for a given position, as he would 
insist (and properly so) in being selected for the subject position 
instead of the two other applicants who had not yet been employed by 
the Highway Patrol. In short, respondents contend that there is no 
provision of law which covers this situation, namely who should decide 
where a suspended member of the Patrol should be employed upon his re-
instatement. In the absence of such a controlling statute, it is reason-
able and therefor lawful for the Commission to make that decision. 
. ; • . ; ; • ; n 
THIS APPEAL IS PREMATURE AS THE SUBJECT ORDER HAS NO FORCE OR 
EFFECT UNTIL FURTHER EVENTS MAY OCCUR AND IF THEY DO, THE PETITIONER HAS 
EXHAUSTED HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES CONCERNING ITS APPLICATION. 
As noted above, petitioner does not and cannot claim any injury 
to him as a result of the subject order. 
If and when petitioner can make such a claim by reason of events 
occuring hereafter, petitioner would be required to exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies before seeking relief through this Court. 
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i 
Before an appeal would properly lie to this Court, at least the 
following two events would need to occur: 
(1) a determination by the Commission that petitioner 
i 
had overcome his drinking problem, 
(2) the Commission would have to determine that the 
Commissioner's decision with respect to the rank or rating 
and position was a proper one. 
The subject order was a final one with respect to the indefinite 
suspension, but it is not a final order with respect to the future em-
ployment, if any, of petitioner by the Patrol and hence not appealable. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the case of Wisconsin Telephone Co. 
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, et al., 34 N.W. 2d 844, cited 
favorably from 42 Amer. Jurisprudence, Sec. 196, pp. 577 to 579, as fol-
1 ows: 
"Courts are averse to review interim steps in an admin-
istrative proceeding. Whether review is sought in nonstatutory 
or statutory proceedings, review of preliminary or procedural 
orders is generally not available, primarily on the ground that 
such a review would afford opportunity for constant delays in 
the course of administrative proceedings for the purpose of re-
viewing mere procedural requirements or interlocutory directions. 
Broad language of statutes providing for judicial review or 
orders of regulatory commissions has been construed as not ex-
tending to every order which the commission may make, and mere 
preliminary or procedural, as distinguished from final, orders 
have been held not to be within such statutes, especially where 
the context of the provision indicates that the orders for 
which review is provided are such as are of a definitive char-
acter dealing with the merits of a proceeding and resulting from 
a hearing upon evidence and supported by findings. * * * 
Statutory review has been denied by the courts where, although 
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the action sought to be reviewed may have the effect of 
forbidding or compelling conduct on the part of the per-
son seeking to review it, this result will follow only 
if some further action is taken by the administrative 
authority, on the theory that the order sought to be 
reviewed does not of itself adversely affect the com-
plainant, but only affects his rights adversely on the 
contingency of future administrative action." 42 Am. 
Juris., Sec. 196, pp. 577-578; Federal Power Commis-
sion v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375, 385, 58 
S.Ct. 963, 82 L.Ed. 1408; Rochester Tel. Corporation v. 
United States, 307 U.S. 125, 129, 131, 59 S.Ct. 754, 83 
L.Ed. 1147; Shannahan v. United States, 303 U.S. 596, 
58 S.Ct. 732, 83 L.Ed. 1039; National Labor Relations 
Board v. Falk Corporation, 308 U.S. 453, 60 S.Ct. 307, 
84 L.Ed. 396; National Labor Relations Board v. Inter-
national Brotherhood E. W., 308 U.S. 413, 60 S.Ct. 306, 
84 L.Ed. 354; Delaware and H. Corporation v. United 
States, 266 U.S. 438, 45 S.Ct. 153, 69 L.Ed. 369. 
Ill 
THE HIGHWAY PATROL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN 
LEAVING ANY DISCRETION TO THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AS TO RAT-
ING, RANK OR POSITION TO BE GIVEN TO A REINSTATED EMPLOYEE OF THE HIGH-
WAY PATROL. 
The challenged order does grant to the Commissioner the respon-
sibility of determining at what rating or rank and in what position the 
petitioner should be employed if and when he is reinstated by a subse-
quent order of the Commission. Manifestly the Commissioner, who spends 
his full time administering the affairs of the Highway Patrol, is far 
better qualified to determine what employment of petitioner would best 
serve the interests of the Highway Patrol and the public it serves in 
light of the qualifications and performance of other officers and em-
ployees of the Highway Patrol than is the Highway Patrol Civil Service 
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Commission whose members devote but a very small portion of their work-
ing time to the affairs of the Patrol and who thus are not knowledgeable 
as to the day by day performance of officers and members of the Highway 
Patrol. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the subject order because 
he has not been injured by it. Petitioner has not exhausted his admin-
istrative remedy of seeking relief from any unfavorable ruling which 
might confer standing on him before this Court, and can not exhaust such 
remedies until the subject order is acted upon and becomes a final order. 
Accordingly, petitioner should be denied relief and his writ of certiorari 
should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
^KMLM 'tfi**^ 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Defendants and Respondents 
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